Many have dismissed out of hand the information that Stephen Hayes has compiled in his book, The Connection as blatherings based almost entirely on a leaked, highly classified memo from Douglas Feith of the Defense Department. In truth, the allegations in the book are based on much more, and it is disingenuous and dangerous to dismiss them so simplistically and uncritically.
Read Part 2 of this series: "al Qaeda and Iraq: A Connection? Clinton Says Yes".
The fact that Abu Musab al Zarqawi found sanctuary in Iraq makes it clear that Iraq and al Qaeda have some sort of a working relationship. It stands to reason that there might just be more to this story...
In its critique of Stephen F. Hayes book, The Connection, Media Matters suggests that the book is based almost entirely on a 16-page, highly classified memo that was (illegally?) leaked by Under-secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Hayes. The Media Matters analysis also implies that Hayes could not be an expert on the subject that he writes about. In point of fact, the book:
is based on several trips to the Middle East; three to Iraq. It draws on sources built in that time, and includes hundreds of interviews with former Iraqi military officers; Iraqi immigrants to the United States; senior officials in the new Iraqi government, in Europe, and in the Middle East; current and former U.S. intelligence officials; soldiers and officers in the U.S. military; and senior policy makers in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Hayes' book suspiciously has no foot- or endnotes. It does claim, however, that "much of the information...comes from 'open sources.' So I set out to confirm or deny those open sources.
The first chapter of the book discusses an admittedly obscure figure, Ahmed Hikmat Shakir.
"The enemy of my enemy is my friend," says the saying. It is not at all improbable that two individuals, Bin Laden and Hussein, could have had a relationship of general hatred except in those cases where they shared a mutual enemy. In 1998, the Clinton administration stated that Iraq posed a threat as a "rogue state with weapons of mass destruction" who appeared ready to use them. Within the week, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa against America, claiming that because of their continuing aggression against the people of Iraq, all Americans should be killed.
Although the claim has engendered a large amount of controversy, Ahmed Hikmat Shakir possibly facilitated collaboration between al Qaeda and Iraq. It has become a sacrosanct tenet of George W. Bush's American detractors that "There's absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda, ever," as Richard Clarke put it. In an effort to maintain public respect for this allegation, it seems paramount that the story of Ahmed Shakir be thoroughly discredited. In an effort to dismiss what turns out to be some very interesting reportage on the part of Hayes, Media Matters attempts such an impetuous dismissal of Hayes claim as that "the story was most likely the result of 'confusion over names.' "
Here are some of the statements that Hayes makes about Shakir in chapter one of The Connection:
1. Shakir told co-workers that he had been hired by "a contact in the Iraqi embassy." The Iraqi embassy figure told him when to report to work and when not to. (p. 1)
Global security reports, among other things, on who may have been the embassy contact.
2. Shakir met and escorted Khalid al Mihdhar in Malaysia on January 5, 2000, to the home of al Qaeda member, Yazid Sufaat. Malaysian intelligence followed Shakir and al Mihdhar and photographed their adventure. al Mihdhar was later determined to be one of the hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 that struck the Pentagon on 9/11. (pp. 3-4)
Here's what McClatchy newspapers reported around that time.
Cooperative Research lists news stories that discuss Shakir's possible meetings with al Qaeda and his associations with al Mihdhar.
3. Shakir knew and had worked with Zahid Sheik Mohammed and Musab Yasin, brothers of the masterminds of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. His phone contained the number of Abu Hajer al Iraqi, an original member of al Qaeda.
The above Cooperative Research link delves into these possibilities as well.
4. On October 21, 2001, Shakir boarded a plane for Iraq, but was detained in Amman, Jordan by Jordanian intelligence. Immediately thereafter, a flurry of communications, originating from inside the Iraqi government, sought to obtain his release.
NewsMax explains how and why Shakir was eventually released.
5. Jordanian intelligence concluded that Shakir's embassy contact in Malaysia worked for the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and that it was highly likely that Shakir was working for IIS as well.
Not all of this information may be accurate, but it is compelling. Hayes even admits that it does not necessarily prove that Iraq and al Qaeda worked together to plan and conduct the 9/11 attacks. But for someone who is not hell-bent on claiming that George W. Bush is a fraud and that we had no business invading Iraq, it seems that the information in Hayes' book bears the need for a great deal of study.
Read Part 2 of this series: "al Qaeda and Iraq: A Connection? Clinton Says Yes".
