Tikrit and ar Rutbah: How To and How Not To Serve Iraq

A lot of members of the military are fighting machines. Not so many of them are understanding of and friendly with the indigenous people among whom they serve. Developing a rapport is, however, a critical facet of a successful counter-insurgency. Here are some examples of how it was done correctly and how it was done miserably in two places--Tikrit and ar Rutbah.

The other day I walked out of my office and found the parking lot encased in a construction fence. No one had given any warning that construction was about to begin, but it was clear that we would not be allowed to park in our parking lot for several months to come. There was a lot of talk the next day at work about how someone had come unannounced onto our turf and barred us from using it in the way that we were used to.

Imagine, if we felt so violated by a simple construction fence, how the Iraqi people felt when the coalition forces not only broke the Hussein regime, but then stayed and occupied their country. Some military leaders understood and sympathized with the indigenous people and encouraged them to invest in their own future, while other military leaders ignored the high dividends that such mutual understanding would engender. One of the most important facets of counter-insurgency tactics is to build a rapport with the people and let them know that you are there to help them achieve peace and living enjoyment. In essentially every case where this has been implemented in Iraq, it has worked marvelously. But then there are those who come in and screw it all up.

Here are two stories of how, at first, large amounts of mutual trust and understanding were built up, and then how after a battle handover, new units in the area ruined pretty much all the goodwill that had been created.

Tikrit

The first Marine Division had occupied Tikrit in 2003. They established a good rapport with the people of the city, particularly its leaders, considering the negative feelings the people were bound to feel for an occupying force. Then the 4th Infantry Division arrived. As the Marines gave the soldiers a tour of the city and were introduced to its leaders, who were working very peacefully with the Marines, they began to get the feeling that the 4th ID people didn't share the same priorities as they did.

The 4th ID initially assumed that the Tikritis were their enemies, and the 4th ID's oppositional tactics formed accordingly. The Marines threw a farewell party for the Tikritis, but the 4th ID representatives who were invited refused to attend. The adversarial perception became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It took a couple of months before the gains the Marines had achieved were completely wiped out in Tikrit. A city that had developed understanding and trust for the Americans now hated them.

Ar Rutbah

Ar Rutbah is a fairly small city of about 25,000 in far western Anbar province. Despite having initially taken some hostile fire from the city, Major Jim Gavrilis approached its leaders in a non-hostile fashion. He tried to understand the feelings of the people, and because of this he was able to build strong relationships. He dined with them and got to know their concerns. He encouraged members of the local police force to take part in local checkpoints. He put sheikhs in charge of monitoring looting and other crimes. He handed relief supplies to the local leaders to be distributed as they saw fit. "The laws and values of their society and culture were just fine," he said. They just needed to be enforced.

The unit that replaced Gavrilis' unit had other ideas as to how to function in Ar Rutbah. No longer were the Iraqis treated as equals. No longer were American troops integrated into the social structure of the city. Quickly the situation deteriorated, and Americans came again to be seen as the occupying enemy.

It is common sense that when an army occupies another country, it will not for long be perceived as liberators. Unless--unless those who occupy make an attempt to understand the people and their history and culture. In those cases where an empathic attempt has been made, it has reaped huge dividends. Where such an approach has either not been tried or has been overturned, it has reaped the whirlwind.

The United States of France

It has been customary over the last couple of centuries for other nations to look down on the French, in general, as wussies. But times are a changin'. In our gadarene rush to disfavor George W. Bush, we have nearly become the United States of France. The point about Iraq is that the Iraqi people once trusted the American people, but it seems they would be stupid to trust us now, and I guess we don't care.

Since the victory of the Democratic party in November, the French is coming out in us. The French people as a whole have pretty much always been wimps, but now, it seems, so are Americans.

The French in the last century or so haven't found a fight that they didn't run away from. The French have descended from a people low in morals, high in obsequiousness to their leaders, and even higher in personal aggrandizement and prestige seeking. It is, therefore, no difficult feat to understand why they have so many problems today (unemployment, increasing violence, love for socialism, and fear of Iran, to name a few).

What is more difficult to understand, however, is how a country descended from hearty, self-sufficient, and truth-loving stock could have become so much like the wussy French. I guess most of us are too busy watching CSI, Survivor, and American Idol to make much of our lives, and a significant additional percentage of us hate George Bush so bad that we can't think the current issue through to its logical conclusion.

No matter how much even a majority of us wish it to be true, the main point of the war in Iraq is not oil. Oil is important, and we should open up the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge and the Gulf of Mexico so that we can become independent of foreign oil. But it has never been the primary issue.

We are in a situation now that the main point is also no longer whether or not the Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. Some democrats and some republicans never thought there were any--including me--but many others thought there were. Saddam had pursued nuclear weapons production and gave a pretty good (although false) indication that he was close to producing them. Saddam used his chemical and conventional weapons too fertilize the vast deserts of Arabia with the bodies of tens of thousands. But that is no longer the point, either.

The main point, unfortunately for some, is also not whether George W. Bush and Dick Cheney lied to the American people. It appears that they jumped to conclusions, but even if they lied, this is no longer the point.

The point of it all, and the only point that matters, is that the majority of Iraqis once trusted the American people, but apparently that trust was as misplaced as if it had been placed in France.

A poll was recently conducted of Iraqis that came to the following conclusions (1) 19 of 20 Iraqis say security was better under Saddam Hussein, (2) 9 in 10 people feel unsafe around American soldiers, and (3) 2/3 will feel safer when US troops leave Iraq.

In a world where people were completely free of fear, the poll numbers might mean something, but these poll numbers are next to useless. Here's why:

1. Security was better under Saddam, because if someone attempted to violate Saddam’s security, he dispatched his angels of death or torture, a strong deterrent.

2. 9 out of 10 people in Baghdad, where Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies is based, probably have something to fear were they to say they feel safe with American soldiers around. After all, is that really a pollster on the other end of the phone line?

3. That 2/3 feel safer could be a feeling that can also be explained by my item number two, or it could be a hope that Sunni and Shia will stop attacking each other when America leaves–a tenuous bet at best, unless…we bring back Saddam to restore security.

The Iraqis don't trust us. After all, they can watch our news and see all the crap that gets reported and the stuff that doesn't. After all, self-centered and Bush-bashing types have been clamoring for at least the last two years for the United States to abandon Iraq. And it looks like we've just about capitulated to these voices of venom and unreason.

So, since we are failing the Iraqi people yet again, I suggest a name change more fitting of our inability to stand for anything--The United States of France.

Would you trust us? I wouldn't. We're wussies!!