Summary: As I searched the news of Iraq before I became involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom, one oddity stuck out in my mind: What is Muqtada al Sadr’s beef with the US—after all he’s Shia’? It is now becoming more clear. Muqtada is a prostitute for the Iranian government.
About two and a half years ago I followed the news of Operation Iraqi Freedom from the safety of my computer programmer’s chair. I remember being perplexed at the time by one individual—Muqtada al Sadr. Why was he fighting the coalition forces? He is, after all, a Shia’ Muslim, the sect that makes up 60% of the Iraqi society. The sect that Saddam brutally butchered in the holy southern cities of Najaf, Kufa, and Karbala after Operation Desert storm. The sect that had been excluded from positions of power in Saddam’s army, and instead did all of the dirty work. The sect that only recently had become free once again to observe the Day of Ashurah after being banned by Saddam for twenty years or so.
Since coming to Iraq, I’ve taken several opportunities to learn more about Iraqi and Islamic culture. And what I’ve found is that Iraqi culture is interwoven with Iranian culture, usually not in a good way. A tutor of mine taught me about the tataluaat, or the “deep secret operatives” as he translated it for me. The tataluaat are from Iran, have moved to Iraq (particularly in the south), have purchased homes there and assimilated with the population, have in many cases polished away the Iranian accent from their Arabic-as-a-second-language, and were influencing Iraqi politics in a very large way. Iran is more predominantly Shia’ than is Iraq, and is having a profoundly negative effect on the Iraqi Shia’. It is probably accurate to say that Iran is the biggest player in the attempt to erase liberty from the Middle East. A democratic republic in Iraq would severely cramp the Iranian mullahs’ lifestyle.
I recently read “My Year in Iraq” by L. Paul Bremer. Mr. Bremer was President Bush’s special envoy to Iraq, tasked with setting up a temporary governing authority, and scheduling elections (which occurred as planned in January, October, and December 2005). One of Mr. Bremer’s greatest regrets is that more was not done to reign in Muqtada al Sadr. Initially, the US ignored Muqtada as insignificant. Wrong. On one occasion, the Spanish contingent of the military coalition was given the responsibility of putting an end to Muqtada’s fledgeling army. It balked. At any rate, Muqtada’s army has gotten very large and is believed by many now to be a much more serious threat to Iraqi democratic stability than the Sunni-led insurgency.
As I’ve done more research on the subject, I have discovered that Muqtada himself has visited the mullahs in Iran many times. Muqtada and his Mahdi army have been trained in Iran on numerous occasions. Iran has been proven to be the source of a large percentage of the weapons used against coalition forces, Iraqi troops, Iraqi police, and Iraqi civilians.
So now it makes sense. Muqtada does not love Iraq. Muqtada loves power. Muqtada loves Muqtada. He can consolidate his power (at least while it suits them) by cavorting with the un-popularly elected Iranian government. So when you get right down to it, Muqtada al Sadr is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s little whore. Who is the infidel now?